The uploads directory is the only place in this application where content someone else authored is served over HTTP. #95 stopped a dangerous file being stored; this stops a stored file doing damage if one ever gets there anyway — through a gap, a path added later, a restore, or a file written before that validation existed. Two halves, complementary rather than alternative. The app's own origin now serves uploads defensively. An allowlist of the three extensions the upload path can produce, so a `.html` or a `.svg` on disk is simply not a file this application hands out — 404, the same answer as a file that is not there, so the response cannot be used to learn which paths exist. An allowlist rather than a denylist because a denylist has to anticipate every type a browser might execute, which is a moving target across browsers and years, while this only has to know three. The content type is stated explicitly from that same list rather than sniffed or guessed from a name someone else chose, paired with `nosniff`. `default-src 'none'; sandbox` gives a directly-navigated file no capabilities at all, which is the only way one of these can do harm — an `<img>` embed does not execute script. Writes get 405 rather than falling through to a 404 that suggests the path is wrong. The other half is the separate origin, which is the real fix, because the origin is the whole unit of trust in a browser. That needs a hostname and a certificate, which live outside this repository, so what is here is the switch: `UPLOADS_BASE_URL`, sent to the frontend at runtime through `/api/config` and joined onto stored paths by `uploadUrl`. Empty means the app's own origin, which is the default and what local development has, so nothing changes until it is pointed somewhere. Stored paths stay site-relative. A stored value outlives any hostname baked into it, and rewriting them would be a migration to undo the day the hostname changes. Runtime rather than built in, so one image serves every environment — the same reason `paypalClientId` and `demoMode` are already there. `UPLOADS_BASE_URL` has a line in `docker-compose.prod.yml` while still empty, deliberately: a Portainer stack variable with no line there is substituted into the file and never reaches the container, which is exactly how `UPLOADS_DIR` went missing on 2026-08-23. Unset warns at boot, in the same shape as the admin gate — a working configuration with one defence switched off is worth saying out loud. Set without a scheme is refused outright, because a bare hostname joins onto a stored path as if it were relative and breaks every image on the site rather than failing visibly. The compose guard now resolves `${VAR:-default}` to its default, which is what the container actually receives when the stack variable behind it is unset. A bare `${VAR}` is still left opaque, so a required variable referenced that way goes on counting as present — that check is about the line existing, not about the stack being filled in. Closes #103
180 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
180 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { readFileSync, readdirSync } from 'fs';
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import path from 'path';
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import { ALWAYS_REQUIRED, validateEnv } from '../../src/envValidation';
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/**
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* The guard for #107 and #118.
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*
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* #107 was not the missing variable — it was that nothing connected two files.
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* envValidation.ts gained a required variable and docker-compose.qa.yml did
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* not set it, and nothing noticed until the container refused to boot on a
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* deploy. CI passed throughout, because CI sets its own environment and never
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* reads the compose file.
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*
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* So this reads the real list from the validator rather than a copy. A copy
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* would pass forever while the next added variable went unguarded in precisely
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* the same way. For the same reason the per-file check below runs `validateEnv`
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* itself rather than restating its rules: the point is that each deploying file
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* satisfies the validator, and any restatement here is one more thing to drift.
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*
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* #118 was the other half. This used to read QA's file alone, while production
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* ran from a Portainer stack outside the repository that nothing could check.
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* That was worse than an even gap, because a green test implied a coverage it
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* did not have: UPLOADS_DIR is in ALWAYS_REQUIRED, QA set it, production did
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* not, and on 2026-08-23 production refused to boot for exactly that reason —
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* while the variable was set in Portainer, where stack variables are
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* substituted into the compose file rather than handed to the container, so a
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* variable with no line in the file never reaches the app at all.
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*/
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const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', '..');
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/**
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* Every deployment this repository describes, and what is true of each.
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*
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* Registered rather than discovered blindly, because the environments differ on
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* purpose — QA runs in demo mode with no PayPal credentials and a mail
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* allowlist, production is the reverse of all three — so "the files agree with
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* each other" would be the wrong assertion. What each file has to satisfy is
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* the validator, plus the handful of things below that are properties of that
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* environment rather than of the code.
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*
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* A compose file at the repository root that is not registered here fails the
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* last test in this file. That is deliberate: adding an environment should
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* force the decision about what is true of it, rather than silently inheriting
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* whatever the loop happened to assert.
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*/
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const DEPLOYMENTS = [
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{
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file: 'docker-compose.qa.yml',
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demoMode: 'true',
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// The entire safety property of QA: delivery is restricted to named
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// recipients, so a run against a database full of test fixtures cannot
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// email a real customer. Asserted because the compose file claims it must
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// not depend on somebody remembering to set something.
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requiresMailAllowlist: true
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},
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{
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file: 'docker-compose.prod.yml',
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demoMode: 'false',
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// Deliberately unrestricted. Production has to be able to reach real
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// customers, and it is the one environment where that is correct.
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requiresMailAllowlist: false
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}
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] as const;
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/**
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* What the container receives for a `${VAR:-default}` entry when the stack
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* variable behind it is unset — which is the case worth modelling, since a
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* variable that is always set needs no default.
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*
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* A bare `${VAR}` is deliberately left alone. It stays an opaque non-empty
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* string so that a required variable referenced that way still counts as
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* present, which is the whole contract described below: what is checked here is
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* that the *line exists*, not that the stack behind it is filled in.
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*/
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function resolveDefault(value: string): string {
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const withDefault = /^\$\{[A-Z_0-9]+:-(.*)\}$/.exec(value);
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return withDefault?.[1] ?? value;
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}
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// Only real environment entries — `- NAME=value` at an indented list position.
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// A mention inside a comment cannot match, because a comment line starts with #.
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function environmentEntries(source: string): Map<string, string> {
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const entries = new Map<string, string>();
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// The split pattern tolerates carriage returns. A checkout with CRLF line
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// endings, which is every fresh clone on Windows, otherwise leaves a stray
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// carriage return that the end-of-line anchor below cannot match, and every
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// assertion in this file then silently finds nothing at all. That is exactly
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// the failure the "parsed some entries" case exists to catch, and it is how
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// this guard was found to be broken.
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for (const line of source.split(/\r?\n/)) {
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const match = /^\s+- ([A-Z_0-9]+)=(.*)$/.exec(line);
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// Both groups are non-optional in the pattern, so a match always has them —
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// but RegExpExecArray cannot say so, and #101 made the compiler insist.
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const [, name, value] = match ?? [];
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if (name !== undefined && value !== undefined) {
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entries.set(name, resolveDefault(value.trim()));
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}
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}
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return entries;
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}
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describe.each(DEPLOYMENTS)('$file provides everything the app requires to boot', (deployment) => {
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const compose = readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, deployment.file), 'utf8');
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const entries = environmentEntries(compose);
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it('parsed some environment entries at all', () => {
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// Guards the guard: a regex that matched nothing would make every
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// assertion below vacuously true.
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expect(entries.size).toBeGreaterThan(5);
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});
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it.each([...ALWAYS_REQUIRED])('sets %s', (name) => {
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expect(entries.has(name)).toBe(true);
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});
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/**
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* The strongest form of this check, and the one that cannot drift: hand the
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* file's own entries to the real validator and require it to be satisfied.
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*
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* An interpolated `${SECRET}` counts as present, which is correct — what is
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* being checked is that the *line exists*, since that is what decides whether
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* the value reaches the container. Whether the stack variable behind it is
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* set is a different failure, and one the app already reports clearly at boot.
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*
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* Errors only. Production warns about MAIL_ALLOWLIST by design, and silencing
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* that warning would remove the notice that this environment can email real
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* customers.
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*/
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it('satisfies validateEnv, the same check the container runs at boot', () => {
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const { errors } = validateEnv(Object.fromEntries(entries));
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expect(errors).toEqual([]);
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});
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it(`sets DEMO_MODE to ${deployment.demoMode}`, () => {
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expect(entries.get('DEMO_MODE')).toBe(deployment.demoMode);
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});
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// The reason UPLOADS_DIR is hardcoded rather than taken from a stack
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// variable is that it has to agree with the volume mapping. That claim is
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// only worth making if something checks it — and its absence from production
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// is what stopped that stack booting.
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it('points UPLOADS_DIR at the directory the uploads volume is mounted on', () => {
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const uploadsDir = entries.get('UPLOADS_DIR');
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expect(uploadsDir).toBeTruthy();
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expect(compose).toContain(`:${uploadsDir}`);
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});
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// Interpolated rather than hardcoded, so the secret itself never enters the
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// repository. Present as a reference is what matters; an unset stack variable
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// resolves to empty, which the validator and the gate both read as "off".
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it('references ADMIN_GATE_SECRET from the stack rather than holding a value', () => {
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expect(entries.get('ADMIN_GATE_SECRET')).toBe('${ADMIN_GATE_SECRET}');
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});
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if (deployment.requiresMailAllowlist) {
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it('restricts delivery with MAIL_ALLOWLIST', () => {
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expect(entries.get('MAIL_ALLOWLIST')).toBeTruthy();
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});
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}
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});
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describe('every deployment in the repository is under this guard', () => {
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// The failure #118 was about was a file nothing read. A new environment added
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// as a compose file and not registered above would reproduce it exactly, so
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// the omission has to fail rather than pass quietly.
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//
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// Scoped to the repository root: backend/docker-compose.test.yml is a bare
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// Postgres for the integration suite, with no app service and nothing here to
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// say about it.
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it('registers every root-level compose file in DEPLOYMENTS', () => {
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const found = readdirSync(REPO_ROOT).filter(
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(name) => /^docker-compose\..+\.ya?ml$/.test(name)
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);
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const registered = DEPLOYMENTS.map((d) => d.file);
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expect(found.slice().sort()).toEqual(registered.slice().sort());
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});
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});
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