/**
 * Serving user-uploaded files, defensively.
 *
 * Everything under the uploads directory was put there by someone other than
 * the people who wrote this application, and it is served over HTTP. #95 stops
 * a dangerous file being *stored*; this stops a stored file *doing damage* if
 * one ever gets there anyway — through a gap, a path added later, or a file
 * written before that validation existed.
 *
 * The real fix for that class is a separate origin, because the origin is the
 * whole unit of trust in a browser (#103). That needs a hostname and a
 * certificate, which live outside this repository, so what is here is the half
 * that works either way: the app's own origin stops serving anything it does
 * not recognise, and serves what it does recognise in a form that cannot be
 * talked into executing.
 *
 * These two are complementary rather than alternatives. The separate origin
 * still points at these same files, so the rules below apply there too.
 */

import express, { Request, Response, NextFunction, Router } from 'express';
import path from 'path';
import { typeForExtension } from './uploadTypes';

/**
 * A directly-navigated upload gets no capabilities at all.
 *
 * `default-src 'none'` leaves a document unable to load or run anything, and
 * `sandbox` with no allowances drops it into an opaque origin, so even a file
 * that somehow renders as markup cannot reach the site's cookies or DOM.
 *
 * This does nothing to an `<img>` embed, which is the only way these files are
 * legitimately used — a policy on an image response constrains the image's own
 * (nonexistent) subresource loads, not the page displaying it.
 */
const UPLOAD_CSP = "default-src 'none'; sandbox";

/**
 * Whether a request should reach the files at all.
 *
 * Only GET and HEAD: express.static ignores the rest anyway, but answering 405
 * says so rather than falling through to a 404 that suggests the path is wrong.
 */
function methodAllowed(method: string): boolean {
  return method === 'GET' || method === 'HEAD';
}

export function uploadsRouter(directory: string): Router {
  const router = express.Router();

  router.use((req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
    if (!methodAllowed(req.method)) {
      res.set('Allow', 'GET, HEAD');
      res.status(405).json({ error: 'method not allowed' });
      return;
    }

    // An allowlist rather than a denylist of dangerous extensions. A denylist
    // has to anticipate every type a browser might execute, which is a moving
    // target across browsers and years; this only has to know the three types
    // the upload path can produce, and everything else — including a `.html` or
    // a `.svg` sitting on disk from before there was any validation — is simply
    // not a file this application will hand out.
    const contentType = typeForExtension(path.extname(req.path));
    if (contentType === null) {
      // 404 rather than 403: whether a file exists at that path is not
      // something a stranger needs to be able to distinguish.
      res.status(404).json({ error: 'not found' });
      return;
    }

    // Set here rather than only in setHeaders below, so a request that never
    // reaches a file still carries them.
    res.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
    res.set('Content-Security-Policy', UPLOAD_CSP);
    next();
  });

  router.use(
    express.static(directory, {
      // No directory listings and no index.html, both of which would be content
      // this application did not write being served as if it had.
      index: false,
      // A dotfile in an upload directory is never something to hand out.
      dotfiles: 'ignore',
      setHeaders: (res: Response, filePath: string) => {
        const contentType = typeForExtension(path.extname(filePath));
        if (contentType !== null) {
          // Stated explicitly rather than left to express.static's extension
          // lookup. Paired with nosniff, the type a browser sees is then the
          // one this application chose, from a list of three, and never a guess
          // made from the bytes.
          res.set('Content-Type', contentType);
        }
        // Required once these are served from a hostname of their own: without
        // it a resource-policy-conscious browser refuses the cross-origin
        // `<img>` load. Harmless while the origin is shared.
        res.set('Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy', 'cross-origin');
      }
    })
  );

  return router;
}