e58c8b400904d829c9edd648f7845a740aec5481
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 bermudalamb
|
5ebb366074 |
feat(auth): open sign-in and registration as modals over the page behind (#50)
/login, /register and /forgot-password rendered bare cards with no site header. They linked to each other and nowhere else, so a customer who clicked Log in from the storefront and changed their mind had no way back except the browser's back button. All four auth routes are now modals over the page the customer was already on, reusing the backdrop-location arrangement from #51: a direct visit or a link from an email opens over the storefront, so closing always lands somewhere real. They remain real routes, because /reset-password links to /login and customers may have bookmarks. Signing in or registering now returns the customer to the page behind, signed in, rather than moving them to /account. Someone who signs in while browsing wants to carry on browsing, and this is already how the cart and favorites prompts behave when they resume an interrupted action. The larger half of this is removing the duplication. Signing in existed twice — as these routes and again inside the prompt shown when a signed-out visitor adds to the cart or favorites something — and the two had already drifted. There were three different wordings of the marketing consent in circulation: the register page's, a shorter one in the prompt, and the string the server actually stores. The server keeps that text verbatim so the consent record says what the customer saw, which none of the three did. Both callers now render one shared AuthForm whose checkbox is the exact string the server records, and a test asserts that wording so it cannot drift again silently. Steps within the auth flow replace rather than push, so switching between tabs or stepping to password recovery leaves the whole detour as a single history entry and closing returns to where it started instead of walking back through every tab that was looked at. The privacy policy link opens in a new tab: following it in place would discard a part-filled signup form, and /privacy still has no way back of its own until #52. Test changes follow from the destination change rather than being incidental. Nineteen assertions across seven specs waited for /account after signing in; they now assert the header shows a signed-in customer, which is the condition actually being waited for. Modal submits are scoped to their dialog, because the storefront behind now offers a Log in button of its own and an unscoped locator matched both. Assertions that follow a server round-trip were given a realistic timeout — the 5s default is too tight for a bcrypt hash plus re-rendering the storefront behind the modal. Verified with 83 end-to-end tests, all passing, and type checking clean. No backend changes. Closes #50 |
||
 bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
db7c61c89d |
feat: customer password reset via email round-trip (#32)
Adds "Forgot password?" to the login page, a request page, and a reset page reached by a one-hour, single-use token delivered by email. Reuses customer_tokens with a new password_reset kind alongside verify_email. The request endpoint always answers 200, whether or not the address has an account, so it cannot be used to test addresses for membership. Note /register still reveals existence through its 409 on a duplicate, so this protection is currently partial; closing that is its own change. Completing a reset deletes every session for that customer. A reset prompted by a compromise has to evict the intruder, and leaving a 30-day cookie alive would defeat the point. It also marks the address verified, since receiving the mail is exactly what verification proves, and supersedes any outstanding token so an older link in the inbox cannot be resurrected. Introduces the first rate limiting in the codebase, on the request endpoint only. The limiter is keyed on caller *and* submitted address: keying on IP alone would let one person lock out everyone behind the same proxy, and everything arrives via Nginx Proxy Manager. Applying that same limiter to the reset endpoint, which carries no address, collapsed every caller into one shared bucket -- so that endpoint is deliberately unlimited instead, protected by a 32-byte single-use token whose bcrypt work only runs after the token matches. The e2e tests read the issued token directly from Postgres rather than through a test-support endpoint. An endpoint returning a reset token for an arbitrary address is account takeover for every customer if it is ever reachable, and an environment gate is thin protection against that. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |