d69091d5adccc085db0997f2b9b02a3af4a0283c
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 synAdminandClaude Opus 5
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90e372d6bd |
feat(admin): move a customer's account to an address they can reach (#337)
The third step of the only recovery route a customer who has lost their mailbox has. The first two are contacting the shop and being verified against order history. The third had no implementation, so the answer was a hand-written database edit that left no record of who did it or why. The thing to say plainly, because everything here follows from it: this operation and an account takeover are the same operation. They differ only in whether the verification was sound, and nothing in the software can check that. What the software can do is make the change recorded, announced, and complete in its effects. Recorded. The endpoint refuses without a written reason, and the reason is stored against the account. That row is the only thing that tells a genuine recovery from a takeover afterwards, which is why a hand edit was never acceptable and why the field is required by the server rather than merely collected by the form. It is never shown to the customer: it is a note about how somebody was verified and can name things the customer should not be handed back. There is no column for who did it. Admin access is one shared gate secret in front of a single operator, so such a column could only ever hold a constant, and a constant dressed up as an identity is worse than an honest absence. Announced, to the address being replaced. If the recovery was sound that reaches nobody and costs nothing. If it was not, it reaches the real owner, who is the only person in the world who can say so, and that is the only reason this endpoint is safe to have at all. Its own template rather than the self-service one, because that copy says to contact us if you did not make this change, and here somebody already did — the sentence would be addressed to the customer who just did the thing it asks for, while the person who needs to act on it did nothing. The new address is marked unverified and sent a confirmation link. Somebody reading an address out over the phone has not demonstrated they can receive mail at it, and that is the commonest way this goes wrong harmlessly. Complete in its effects. The move signs the customer out everywhere, removes every passkey, and cancels reset links already sent. That is the conclusion #42 reached for password reset, and it applies here with more force: somebody the system cannot identify asked for this change, so a session or a credential surviving it is one the new owner cannot see and cannot revoke, and a reset link sitting in the mailbox being taken away would let whoever still reads it take the account straight back. The password is left alone. What the customer lost was the mailbox, so demanding a new one adds a step for no gain. The verification-email helper moved out of the customers route into its own module, for the reason session creation moved out for passkeys: two implementations that agree today are two that can be changed one at a time, and the one that gets forgotten is whichever the manual testing does not exercise. This path runs perhaps once a year, so it is exactly the one that would rot. The admin drawer gains the action next to the address rather than among the account controls, because it is a thing done to that field by someone already looking at it. It leads with the warning instead of burying it. The history of moves sits on the same drawer and renders nothing at all for the overwhelming majority of customers, who have never been moved. Verified: backend tsc clean for src and tests, 526 unit tests pass, lint clean apart from warnings that predate this branch; frontend tsc, lint and build clean. The integration suite needs a database this machine has no Docker for. It also cannot be proven by CI right now — run 917 has been hung since it started and 24 runs are queued behind it, which is the same hang #154 identifies as the source of the leftover Postgres containers. Closes #337 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
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b18b3e3a3d |
feat(intake): require an address for an upload link and send the link to it (#260)
Creating a link now requires a valid email address and mails the link to it, which is the whole point: getting a link to a contributor was previously a copy-and-paste into whatever the admin happened to use. The send is awaited and its outcome reported, unlike every other sender in this codebase, which fires and forgets because nobody is waiting on the answer. Here somebody is. The admin is looking at the screen, and whether they now have to send the link by hand is exactly the thing they need to know — and QA blocks delivery to any address outside MAIL_ALLOWLIST by design, so a link that was never emailed would otherwise look precisely like one that was. A send that could not happen does not roll the link back. The token is displayed exactly once, so a rollback would leave the admin retrying and holding a different link, discarding work that had succeeded. They end up with a usable link and an honest statement about delivery instead. One inaccuracy left deliberately: an SMTP rejection is reported as skipped-unconfigured rather than a fourth outcome of its own. The distinction is real but nothing consumes it, and the admin's next action is identical either way. Also updates the other integration tests that created a link with only a label, since an address is now required, and adds the uploadLink template key that GET /api/admin/email-templates was missing from its list — an omission left by the template's addition in the prior commit on this branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
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346e9eae4c |
feat(intake): act on a signed link from the notification (#224)
Mounted publicly, deliberately not behind requireAdminGate. These are clicked from an inbox by someone who is not signed in, which is the whole point; the signature is what protects them. GET confirms and changes nothing, POST acts. Mail scanners and corporate link-rewriting gateways issue a GET against every URL in a message before a human sees it, so a GET that discarded a draft would fire itself on delivery — carrying a valid signature, looking entirely legitimate in the log, and nobody would know to go and recover it. That is the case the split exists for and it has its own test. Forged, replayed, upgraded and expired links are each refused with the same 403. Distinguishing them would tell somebody probing which of those they had achieved. There is no signable publish, and asking for one finds no handler. The two registry guard tests are updated rather than worked around: they assert the full set of settings and template keys, so adding either is exactly what should trip them. Backend now 367 unit and 329 integration, all passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
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7c3463650d |
feat(backend): let a customer change their own name, password and email (#111)
SonarQube Analysis / sonarqube (pull_request) Failing after 12m11s
Two of the three already existed on the backend and had no caller. PUT /api/customers/me updated the name; POST /api/customers/change-password already demanded the current password and enforced the eight-character minimum. Neither was reachable from the frontend, which is why the gap was easy to miss — the API looked finished. The name endpoint accepted empty values and wrote nulls, letting a customer clear fields registration refuses to let them skip. That is the same rule disagreeing with itself, so it now refuses each by name exactly as registration does. Changing a password now ends other sessions and keeps the one making the change. Reset already deleted every session for the customer, on the reasoning that a password is changed precisely when the old one may be known to someone else — change reached the opposite conclusion for no recorded reason, and a session opened with a leaked password outlived the change meant to lock it out. The current session is spared so the change does not eject the person making it. Changing the email address is new. It asks for the current password, because swapping the address a password reset goes to is how an account is taken over and a live session alone is not enough; that also matches what change-password already required. The address is normalised and validated, an address another account holds is refused with the same 409 as registration, and on success the row is marked unverified and any outstanding verification token superseded — one already sitting in the old inbox must not be able to verify the new address. Two emails then go out, to different places. Verification to the new address, and a notice to the old one naming what the address was changed to. The notice is the only thing that tells a real owner their account was taken, and one that does not say where the address went is nearly useless to someone checking whether it was them. Both sends happen after the row is written, never before, so a change that failed cannot produce mail saying it succeeded. That notice is a sixth template in #92's system, which cost a definition and a default body. The unit tests iterate every template, so its defaults were checked against its own required placeholder without writing a new test. Verified: 199 unit and 208 integration passing. The session test signs in on a second agent, changes the password on the first, and asserts the second is refused while the first still works — the property being claimed rather than the code path being executed. One of my own assertions was wrong on the way: /me answers an unauthenticated caller with 401 and an error body, not an empty one, and the frontend is what turns that into null. Refs #111 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
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4ed9513ad2 |
feat(backend): make the five customer emails editable copy (#92)
Every customer email was a template literal in the route that sent it, so changing a word meant a code change, a review and a deploy. All five now render from markdown that an admin can edit: verification, password reset, favorite sold, favorite withdrawn, and the cart reminder. Five, not the four the issue counted — the favorite alerts have separate copy for sold and withdrawn.
markdown-it runs with html disabled, which is its default and the reason for choosing it over marked. Raw HTML in a stored body is escaped rather than passed through, so editing copy cannot put script into a customer's inbox. That is a stronger guarantee than sanitising output, because there is no output to sanitise.
Values are substituted into the markdown before it renders, which means a value that should become a list has to arrive as markdown. The cart reminder previously built li elements by hand; those would now be escaped and shown to the customer as literal angle brackets, so it emits a markdown list instead. The greeting is one placeholder rather than a bare name, so a template author writes {{greeting}} instead of "Hi {{firstName}}," — which reads as "Hi ," for anyone who registered before first names were required.
Saving is refused when a body has dropped a placeholder it needs, naming all of them rather than the first. This is the rule that separates a convenience from a way to break password resets from a settings screen: a reset email with no link still sends, still looks correct in the log, and is useless to everyone who receives it.
The favorite alerts' consent sentence is appended by the server and is not editable. It explains why the customer is receiving the mail, which is a compliance artifact rather than copy, and editing wording should not be able to delete it.
Unset templates fall back to the built-in defaults, so an install that never touches the settings screen behaves exactly as it did. The API reports an uncustomised template as null rather than as its default text, so "never edited" stays distinguishable from "edited to something identical", and DELETE restores the default by forgetting the row rather than writing the default into it.
Two problems surfaced during verification, both worth recording.
Five favorite-alert tests failed with no error and no mail. The cause was not this code: resetDb does not truncate admin_settings, so a subject of "Gone" stored by the new template tests survived into a later suite and changed the mail it was asserting on. Cleaning up inside the template tests would have fixed only that pairing, so resetDb now clears stored templates for every suite — template rows are test data like any other, and one outliving the suite that wrote it makes a failure appear somewhere unrelated.
The withdrawal notification then failed on timing. Loading copy from the database made the sender async, and the removal path was fire-and-forget, so the response could beat the mail out of the door. Dispatch was previously synchronous even though the sends themselves were not awaited; that is now restored by awaiting it.
Verified: 197 unit and 195 integration passing, lint unchanged at 4 warnings. The admin screen for editing these follows in the next commit.
Refs #92
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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