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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 bermudalamb
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6104ebb459 |
feat(ops): read DEMO_MODE from the stack rather than the compose file (#190)
Reverses the position the previous commit took. Hardcoding it made a value that gets flipped without a code change require a commit and a merge to flip, which is backwards — and it is the operator's call, not the file's.
No default, deliberately. `${DEMO_MODE:-false}` is the obvious form and the wrong one: a default decides whether the shop takes money on the operator's behalf, silently, whichever way it points. Having none is safe rather than fragile because `checkDemoMode` is strict — an unset stack variable substitutes to an empty string, and anything that is not exactly `true` or `false` refuses to boot naming DEMO_MODE. That strictness is the whole reason interpolating this one is defensible, so the line says so.
The compose guard had to learn the difference. It hands each deploying file's entries to the real validator, and a literal `${DEMO_MODE}` is not a value `checkDemoMode` accepts, so both the DEMO_MODE assertion and the validateEnv check failed the moment the file stopped holding a literal. Each deployment now declares the stack variables it supplies, and a bare `${VAR}` named there resolves to the declared value before the file is validated. Every other bare `${VAR}` stays opaque exactly as before — those are secrets, and what is checked of them is that the line exists.
Be clear about what that guard can prove. It cannot see Portainer, so it does not verify the stack actually holds `true`; nothing in this repository can. What it does is keep the intent beside the file and make the pair inseparable — hardcode the compose line and the registry disagrees, change the registry and it no longer describes the file. The runtime half is the boot check, which fails loudly rather than falling back. Verified by mutation: hardcoding `false` fails the DEMO_MODE assertion, and deleting the line fails that and `validateEnv`.
Restoring real payments is now two Portainer values and a redeploy, with no commit — which is what #190 asks for.
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bermudalamb
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12b2f09d79 |
docs(ops): point the demo-mode notes at the right issue (#190)
The tracking issue was filed as #190; the compose banner and the guard test both said #191, guessing the number before it existed. A note that points at the wrong issue is worse than no note when the thing it tracks is production not taking money. |
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bermudalamb
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0a830cad1f |
feat(ops): put production in demo mode to complete the cutover (#191)
Production could not boot during the cutover to the committed compose file: `DEMO_MODE` is false there, which makes the three PayPal secrets required, and they were not available. Demo mode is the interim the compose file's own header sanctions for exactly this — the whole cart and checkout flow works and nobody is ever charged.
Two things made this cost more than it should have, and both are now written down rather than left to be rediscovered.
`DEMO_MODE` is hardcoded rather than interpolated, so setting a `DEMO_MODE` stack variable in Portainer does nothing at all — there is no `${...}` for it to substitute into and the file's value wins silently. That hardcoding is right: the one value deciding whether the shop takes money should not be flippable from a web UI without a commit anybody can read. But the failure mode reads as "I set it and it ignored me", so the line now says so.
Declaring `PAYPAL_CLIENT_ID=` with an empty value is identical to not declaring it. `isPresent` rejects a blank string deliberately, because set-to-nothing is a mistake rather than a value.
The state is loud in both places that can see it. The compose file leads with a banner saying production is taking no money, and `composeEnvironment.test.ts` asserts `DEMO_MODE` is `true` — that assertion is the guard, not a formality: it fails the moment the file and the expectation disagree, in either direction, so this cannot be switched back quietly and cannot be left on unnoticed.
#191 restores it.
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bermudalamb
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cf1680dbfb |
feat(security): stop the app origin serving anything it does not recognise, and make the uploads origin configurable (#103)
The uploads directory is the only place in this application where content someone else authored is served over HTTP. #95 stopped a dangerous file being stored; this stops a stored file doing damage if one ever gets there anyway — through a gap, a path added later, a restore, or a file written before that validation existed. Two halves, complementary rather than alternative. The app's own origin now serves uploads defensively. An allowlist of the three extensions the upload path can produce, so a `.html` or a `.svg` on disk is simply not a file this application hands out — 404, the same answer as a file that is not there, so the response cannot be used to learn which paths exist. An allowlist rather than a denylist because a denylist has to anticipate every type a browser might execute, which is a moving target across browsers and years, while this only has to know three. The content type is stated explicitly from that same list rather than sniffed or guessed from a name someone else chose, paired with `nosniff`. `default-src 'none'; sandbox` gives a directly-navigated file no capabilities at all, which is the only way one of these can do harm — an `<img>` embed does not execute script. Writes get 405 rather than falling through to a 404 that suggests the path is wrong. The other half is the separate origin, which is the real fix, because the origin is the whole unit of trust in a browser. That needs a hostname and a certificate, which live outside this repository, so what is here is the switch: `UPLOADS_BASE_URL`, sent to the frontend at runtime through `/api/config` and joined onto stored paths by `uploadUrl`. Empty means the app's own origin, which is the default and what local development has, so nothing changes until it is pointed somewhere. Stored paths stay site-relative. A stored value outlives any hostname baked into it, and rewriting them would be a migration to undo the day the hostname changes. Runtime rather than built in, so one image serves every environment — the same reason `paypalClientId` and `demoMode` are already there. `UPLOADS_BASE_URL` has a line in `docker-compose.prod.yml` while still empty, deliberately: a Portainer stack variable with no line there is substituted into the file and never reaches the container, which is exactly how `UPLOADS_DIR` went missing on 2026-08-23. Unset warns at boot, in the same shape as the admin gate — a working configuration with one defence switched off is worth saying out loud. Set without a scheme is refused outright, because a bare hostname joins onto a stored path as if it were relative and breaks every image on the site rather than failing visibly. The compose guard now resolves `${VAR:-default}` to its default, which is what the container actually receives when the stack variable behind it is unset. A bare `${VAR}` is still left opaque, so a required variable referenced that way goes on counting as present — that check is about the line existing, not about the stack being filled in. Closes #103 |
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bermudalamb
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f32913ef51 |
refactor: turn on noUncheckedIndexedAccess in both workspaces (#101)
Indexing an array now yields `T | undefined`, which is what it always did — the compiler simply says so. Enabled in backend/tsconfig.json and frontend/tsconfig.json, and in tsconfig.sonar.json alongside it so the drift guard stays satisfied. The sequencing this issue insisted on was right, and the numbers show why. Before #159 typed the query results, `rows[0]` was `any` and `any` indexes to `any`: the flag would have found close to nothing and the count would have changed completely afterwards. With the rows typed it finds 57 — 50 in the backend, 4 in the frontend, 3 in the Playwright suite — and they fall into three kinds. Thirty are `rows[0]` after a `rows.length` guard. TypeScript cannot connect the two, and rewriting them as `const [row] = rows; if (!row) …` makes the guard and the use the same check, which is better code independently of the flag. Ten are rows a statement guarantees — `INSERT … RETURNING`, or a lookup for an id the session middleware has already matched. These get `requireRow(rows, what)`, a new helper in db.ts that throws naming the query. A thrown error rather than a non-null assertion: if the assumption is ever wrong, an assertion hands `undefined` to the next line and fails somewhere unrelated, whereas this fails at the query and says which. asyncRoute turns it into a 500, which is the right answer for "the database did not do what the statement says it does". It also states the assumption once instead of ten times. The rest is ordinary indexing the compiler cannot prove: a regex capture group that the pattern guarantees, `split('+')[0]`, a modulo kept in range, `hasOwnProperty` failing to narrow an index signature, and Express typing route params as an index signature so `req.params.itemId` is `string | undefined` on a route that cannot match without it. One correction to this issue's premise, which matters for what it was expected to find. The body says "in a handful it does not guard at all", and the unguarded-500 risk it describes was not found. Every `rows[0]` either sits behind a length check or behind a statement that guarantees a row. What the flag actually bought was the ten places where that guarantee was real but unstated, and those now say so. Two changes worth calling out because they are not mechanical. TAG_COLORS is typed `[string, ...string[]]` in both copies rather than `as const` — the first attempt used `as const`, which narrowed the elements to literals and broke adminTags, so the annotation keeps `string` while telling the compiler index 0 exists. And the filter drawer's slider falls back to the bounds it was given rather than to null, because null there reads as "no filter" and would widen the results rather than leave them unchanged. Test files needed changes too, since ts-jest compiles them against the same config: a regex destructure in the compose guard, and ten `mock.calls[0][0]` reads where the surrounding assertions already establish the call happened. Verified: tsc clean over backend, frontend src and the Playwright suite; unit 254/254; integration 238/238; frontend build clean; lint unchanged in both workspaces. Closes #101 |
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bermudalamb
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3fde6fc6bf |
fix(deploy): commit production's compose and bring it under the drift guard (#118)
Production refused to boot with "UPLOADS_DIR is required and is not set" while UPLOADS_DIR was set in Portainer's stack variables. Both statements were true at once. Portainer substitutes stack variables into the compose file rather than handing them to the container, so a variable with no line in the file never reaches the app — behaviour the QA compose already warns about at its ADMIN_GATE_SECRET entry, hit in production where nothing was watching for it.
Nothing could have caught it. The drift guard reads docker-compose.qa.yml, and production ran from a Portainer stack outside the repository that no test could see. That is worse than an even gap: UPLOADS_DIR is in ALWAYS_REQUIRED and the test was green, so the natural reading was that the deploying environments set it. QA did. Production did not.
So production's compose is now a file in the repository, deployed as a git repository stack rather than pasted into the web editor — otherwise the committed copy and the running copy drift apart again, which is the whole problem.
Values are hardcoded rather than interpolated wherever they are not secrets. Only a secret has a reason to stay out of the repository, and every interpolation is another chance for the failure above. UPLOADS_DIR in particular has to agree with the volume mapping, and splitting it across two files is how they drift.
The guard now runs over every deployment rather than QA alone, and checks each by handing its parsed entries to validateEnv itself rather than restating the rules. A restatement is one more copy to drift; running the real validator means the file is checked against exactly what the container checks at boot. Interpolated ${SECRET} values count as present, which is right — what is being guarded is that the line exists, since that is what decides whether the value reaches the container.
Environments differ on purpose, so the expectations are registered per file rather than shared: QA is demo mode with a mail allowlist and no PayPal credentials, production is the reverse of all three. A root-level compose file that is not registered fails the last test, so adding an environment forces the decision instead of silently inheriting whatever the loop asserted.
Verified by removing the UPLOADS_DIR line from the production file and confirming three tests fail, one of them reproducing the exact boot error. A guard of this kind that has never been seen to fire is indistinguishable from one that cannot.
Two things found while writing this and deliberately not changed here. RESERVATION_MINUTES is set in QA's compose and read nowhere in the code — drift in the opposite direction, which #118's scan half should catch. And production publishes 32750 on every interface exactly as QA does; that is #117, and the reasoning is recorded in a comment at the ports block rather than acted on, since changing it needs the proxy host entry repointed in the same pass.
Refs #118
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bermudalamb
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f76db6c8fe |
fix(test): make the compose guard survive a CRLF checkout (#107)
The guard added for #107 finds nothing on a checkout with CRLF line endings, which is every fresh clone on Windows. Splitting on a bare newline leaves a trailing carriage return, the end-of-line anchor in the entry pattern then cannot match, and all ten assertions in the file fail together. Worth being precise about why this shipped, because the process that was supposed to prevent it ran and did not. That guard was fired deliberately before committing: the UPLOADS_DIR line was removed, two tests failed, the line was restored, ten passed. What the exercise never varied was the file's line endings — and by then the working copy happened to be LF, because the backup-and-restore used to fire the guard had rewritten it that way. So the deliberate firing proved the guard catches a missing variable, on a file shaped exactly as the test run had shaped it, and proved nothing about the shape it meets in a clean clone. The failure mode is the one the file already worried about: parsing that matches nothing makes every other assertion vacuously true. Here it failed loudly instead only because the "parsed some entries at all" case exists — which is the case that turned a silent pass into a visible failure, and is the reason this was noticed at all rather than sitting green and checking nothing. Splitting on an optional carriage return fixes it. 172 unit tests pass on the CRLF checkout that was failing. Found while verifying #106, whose branch could not go green until this was fixed, which is why the fix lands there rather than on its own. Refs #107 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bermudalamb
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a2500a9901 |
test(backend): fail the build when the compose file lacks a required variable (#107)
The one-line compose fix in the previous commit unblocks QA. This is the part that stops it happening again, and it is the more useful half. The failure was not really a missing variable. It was that nothing connected two files: envValidation.ts gained a required variable, docker-compose.qa.yml did not set it, and nothing noticed until a container refused to boot on deploy. CI passed the whole time, because CI supplies its own environment and never reads the compose file — which is exactly why "CI is green" was the wrong evidence to have offered. So a unit test now reads the compose file and asserts it sets everything the validator demands. It imports ALWAYS_REQUIRED rather than restating it, which is the only version of this test worth having: a copied list would pass forever while the next variable added to the validator went unguarded in precisely the same way. Two further assertions earn their place. UPLOADS_DIR is hardcoded rather than taken from a stack variable on the grounds that it must agree with the volume mapping, so the test checks it against the mount rather than leaving that a claim in a comment. And ADMIN_GATE_SECRET must be present as an interpolation rather than a literal, since a secret in the repository would defeat the point of having one. There is also a test guarding the test: a regex that matched nothing would make every other assertion in the file vacuously true, so one case asserts that parsing found entries at all. Fired deliberately rather than assumed. Removing the UPLOADS_DIR line reproduces the original failure as two failing tests; restoring it returns to ten passing. A guard that has only ever been observed passing is not known to guard anything. What this cannot do is check production, which runs from a Portainer stack outside this repository. That gap is now written into the README beside the validation rules, along with the reason a variable set only in Portainer's stack UI never reaches the container: stack variables are interpolated into the compose file, not handed to the service. 172 unit tests pass, lint unchanged at 4 warnings. Refs #107 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |