2c6ac4d2be8902a9d1629150c1f9a196a8a1c760
20
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 synAdminandClaude Opus 5
|
2c6ac4d2be |
feat(auth): offer Google sign-in on the login form (#345)
The last of the six, and the first a customer can see. The auth form is the single sign-in implementation rendered by both the route modal and the cart prompt, so the button goes in one place and appears in both. Below the passkey button, which is below the password form. The order is deliberate and it is not about preference: a passkey is already on the device in front of the customer, while Google is a round trip to somebody else's site, and passwords are how every existing customer signs in. Each step down that list asks more of the person using it. Absent rather than disabled where it is not configured, which is the same call #41 made for a browser without WebAuthn. It matters more here, because being unconfigured is the normal state rather than the exception: local development has no credentials, and QA cannot have any until #313. The storefront advertises a boolean through the existing public config, never the client id — the browser has no use for one, since the whole flow is a redirect the server builds. Google's mark is inlined as SVG with their published colours and geometry. A hand-drawn approximation of somebody else's trademark is a compliance problem rather than a style choice, and a second origin on the sign-in path is a second thing that can be down. The button is a navigation rather than a fetch, which makes it unlike every other control on that form. The flow leaves the application entirely, so there is no promise to await and no error to catch — the callback decides and redirects. Where to return to is supplied by the caller, because only the caller knows. The route modal renders over a backdrop location and its own path is /login, so reading the current URL there would send the customer back to the form they just left; the router builds it from the backdrop instead. The cart prompt uses the page it interrupted. It cannot resume the interrupted action the way onSuccess does — the redirect leaves the app — so the customer lands back on the page and presses the button again. That value is validated on the server and not in the browser. It has to be, since anyone can type the URL, and doing it in one place beats doing it twice in two languages. The end-to-end test asserts the button is ABSENT, which is the behaviour local and QA actually have, and then signs in with the password form to show that its absence changes nothing. That is the point of putting the alternatives below rather than above. docs/ops/google-sign-in.md records what has to be true outside the repository: the seven sections of the Google Auth Platform, the three scopes that keep publishing out of a verification review, the cutover checklist for #313, and the production smoke test. It states plainly that QA on the Synology hostname is impossible rather than merely unconfigured, because Google will not accept a redirect URI whose domain nobody can prove they own — the same wall #285 hit with Cloudflare. The failure that document warns about hardest is leaving the consent screen in Testing. Only listed test users can then sign in, the refusal happens on Google's own page, and nothing reaches the storefront at all — so a customer reports a broken button and the logs are silent. Verified: backend tsc clean for src and tests, 590 unit tests pass, lint at the seven warnings that predate this branch, frontend tsc, lint and build clean. The integration and end-to-end suites need a database this machine has no Docker for. Closes #345 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
synAdminandClaude Opus 5
|
25078417e5 |
feat(auth): create an account from a Google identity, then ask about consent (#342)
A Google account nobody here has seen now becomes a customer. The OAuth part of this was the easy half; the problem worth the issue is consent. Registration asks for two consents and stores their wording verbatim, and marketing consent must start unticked. Somebody arriving through Google has never seen those checkboxes and could not have, because the redirect happened before anyone knew whether they were new. Creating the account with both false is legally correct: nobody agreed to anything, and nothing is recorded as though they had. There is no stored wording either, because a wording saved against a false consent is a record of a conversation that never happened. But stopping there would mean a Google sign-up is never asked at all, and a silent no is still a decision made on somebody else's behalf. So the account is created, the customer is signed in, and they land on a step that shows the same two sentences with the same two unticked boxes. It saves through the endpoints registration already uses, which is what keeps the stored text byte-identical rather than merely similar. Not now is offered as an equal option, because consent has to be as easy to withhold as to give, and both can be changed later from the account page. The wording on that screen is imported from the shared constants rather than retyped. Three different wordings were already in circulation once before that was shared, and the record is meant to say what the customer actually saw. The return path is deliberately dropped for a new customer, who lands on the consent step instead. Carrying it through as a query parameter was the alternative and was rejected: the consent page would then redirect somewhere a URL told it to, which is the open-redirect question already answered on the server, asked a second time in a second language on a page an attacker can link to directly. One new customer occasionally landing on the storefront rather than back at their cart is much the cheaper of the two. The customer and the identity are inserted in one transaction. A customer row with no identity is an account nobody can sign in to and nobody can recover, because it has no password either. Signing up is refused when the address already belongs to a customer. Joining those two accounts is linking, it is the most security-sensitive decision in this project, and it belongs to the next issue rather than falling out of an INSERT here. Refusing is the safe half of that decision and the only half available until the policy is written down. The unique index rather than the preceding SELECT is what actually holds when two sign-ins race, so losing that race is treated as the address being taken rather than as an error. Google's assertion about the address is taken only when it is the boolean true. When it holds, the account is marked verified and no confirmation email is sent, because that email exists to prove the customer receives mail at the address and Google has just proved exactly that. When it does not, the account is unverified and goes through the ordinary confirmation, because an unverified assertion is worth nothing. Names from the profile are hints. Registration demands both because every email greets by first name, but Google may return neither and refusing a sign-in over it would be absurd — the greeting already has a fallback for exactly this case. The tests worth reading are the two about a returning customer. One signs in again and reaches the same account; the other changes their Google address first and still reaches it. That second one is the whole reason the identity is keyed on the subject claim: an email match would have created a second account there, and an address that had since been reassigned would have handed the first one to a stranger. Verified: backend tsc clean for src and tests, 590 unit tests pass, lint at the seven warnings that predate this branch, frontend tsc, lint and build clean. The integration suite needs a database this machine has no Docker for. Closes #342 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
synAdminandClaude Opus 5
|
ac3f6e91f5 |
feat(analytics): report consenting customers' activity to Brevo (#56)
Loads Brevo's web tracker for a signed-in customer who has consented, reports route changes as page views, and tracks the three events the issue asked for: added_to_cart, favorited, and checkout_completed. The four design questions were settled on the issue in August and this implements those answers. The consent gate is the part worth reading. The decision recorded on the issue was "gate it behind consent", but the sentence customers actually agreed to named only email: "I want to receive occasional emails about new one-of-a-kind items". Gating a tracker on `marketing_consent` while that was the stored wording would have treated "email me about new items" as authorisation to send someone's browsing to a third party, which it does not say — and this project stores the wording verbatim against each customer precisely so that a record says what the customer saw. So the sentence is widened here, and the tracker is gated on `analytics_consent`, a field the server computes by comparing the wording stored against a customer with the current constant. Changing the sentence therefore does not retroactively widen anybody's consent: everyone who agreed to the old text keeps their email consent and is not tracked until they re-consent through the account page. A boolean alone could not tell those two populations apart, which is the whole reason the text is stored per customer. `analyticsConsent` is exported and has its own unit test, because "agreeing to the old wording does not authorise tracking" is the rule that silently tracks people if it regresses — their flag really is true. QA stays out of the live Brevo account by construction rather than by remembering. The key is per-environment, the tracker never loads without one, and `docker-compose.qa.yml` sets an empty literal with no stack variable behind it, so nothing can inherit a value from the host or be pasted in from production's stack. Same reasoning as QA_DB_PASSWORD and the QA_SMTP_ names beside it. Events are reported from the API layer rather than the UI call sites, so no caller can add to the cart or favorite an item without it being counted, and each fires only after the response was accepted — a refused add is not reported as one. The two checkout completions each name their processor, because a demo purchase charges nothing and counting it as a sale would overstate revenue. The privacy policy gains an analytics section in this change rather than a follow-up, since the published policy previously described none of this and would otherwise have lagged the code. It is deliberate about the limits: withdrawing consent stops further reporting, but anything already sent stays with Brevo, and a script already injected cannot be un-injected — `stopBrevoTracking` stops calls, it does not unload sa.js. That is said in the code too, because "tracking stops" reads as a stronger promise than any web tracker can make. Verified: backend tsc clean, both lint suites 0 errors with no new warnings, 474 unit tests passing across 33 suites, and the frontend production build green including the compose-environment guard. Not verified: integration and e2e, which need a database and a Node this machine does not have active, and no real Brevo key was exercised — the tracker has never been observed reporting to an actual account. Closes #56 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
 bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
cd2676233c |
chore: clear the six code smells SonarQube reported (#181)
The list finally arrived from the reporting added earlier, and confirmed what #181 could only suspect: these are not the five eslint-plugin-sonarjs warnings that issue lists. Those were fixed under #261 and the count staying at five was a coincidence. It is six now, 25 minutes of debt, and one of them was mine. admin.ts imported '../utils' twice — I added readId in #207 without noticing the file already imported from there. One import now. filters.ts had a redundant `as ItemStatus[]`. TypeScript narrows an array through `.every()` with a type predicate from 5.5, and this project is on 5.9, so the assertion stopped telling the compiler anything. Removed, and the build confirms the narrowing holds without it. adminSettings.ts was the only CRITICAL: cognitive complexity 18 against a limit of 15, almost all of it three near-identical loops differing only in how they validated. Each validation is now a small pure reader returning a refusal rather than sending one, and the handler is one loop over a table. Adding a setting type means adding a row. That refactor is deliberately behaviour-preserving. Two things were left alone on purpose: the blanket rejection of empty text, which is wrong for the two settings whose documented default is empty and is filed as #280 rather than folded in where it would be invisible; and the absence of the `count` settings, which no caller submits and which the admin screen has no control for. I had started adding count validation and reverted it — widening behaviour under cover of a complexity fix is how a refactor stops being reviewable. The three S6478s are render props, not components defined during render. ErrorBoundary's `fallback` is typed `(error: Error) => React.ReactNode` and called as `this.props.fallback(...)`, so React only ever sees returned elements and never a new component type — the subtree destruction the rule describes does not happen, and the rule's own message offers `allowAsProps` for this shape, which cannot be set from here. Hoisted rather than suppressed because none of them closes over anything local, so at module level each is one stable function instead of a new closure per render. That is a mild improvement, not a contortion. Verified: 402 backend unit, 358 backend integration, 30 frontend unit, 157 e2e, both lints clean, both builds clean. The e2e run matters most here — storefront-errors.spec.ts exercises all three hoisted fallbacks, and it was run on its own first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalamb
|
e7b01fdb36 |
feat(intake): add the public submission page (#222)
Where someone with no account sends in photos of one item. Route /submit/:token, outside the authentik gate by design: the token in the URL is the whole access control, which is what #222 chose deliberately over accounts. One state for every refusal, matching the server's single 404. Unknown, revoked and used-up links all render the same "this link is not active" card, because saying which kind of dead it was would tell a stranger whether a link they guessed at exists — the server is careful about that and the page must not undo it. `beforeUpload` returns false so antd keeps the files rather than uploading each one as it is picked. The submission is then a single request the server can accept or refuse as a unit, which is what makes the transaction on the other side meaningful. The accepted types and the six-file cap are stated here so the picker offers exactly what will be taken, but both are checked again server-side, because everything on this page is under the sender's control. The fetch effect guards against a late response from a previous token overwriting the current answer, which is reachable simply by editing the URL. TypeScript caught a real mistake rather than a stylistic one: `.filter((f): f is File => ...)` on antd's originFileObj does not narrow, because RcFile extends File and the predicate would widen rather than narrow. flatMap avoids the predicate entirely. Verified in a browser rather than by inspection: a throwaway Playwright run against the live stack confirmed the form renders for a good token, the inactive card renders for a bad one, and a photo can actually be sent and acknowledged. The database then showed the item at status pending with the default price, the draft carrying the note and its originating link, the image row written, the link's counter at one — and zero storefront-visible items, which is the property that matters most. Ref #222 |
||
|
bermudalamb
|
cf1680dbfb |
feat(security): stop the app origin serving anything it does not recognise, and make the uploads origin configurable (#103)
The uploads directory is the only place in this application where content someone else authored is served over HTTP. #95 stopped a dangerous file being stored; this stops a stored file doing damage if one ever gets there anyway — through a gap, a path added later, a restore, or a file written before that validation existed. Two halves, complementary rather than alternative. The app's own origin now serves uploads defensively. An allowlist of the three extensions the upload path can produce, so a `.html` or a `.svg` on disk is simply not a file this application hands out — 404, the same answer as a file that is not there, so the response cannot be used to learn which paths exist. An allowlist rather than a denylist because a denylist has to anticipate every type a browser might execute, which is a moving target across browsers and years, while this only has to know three. The content type is stated explicitly from that same list rather than sniffed or guessed from a name someone else chose, paired with `nosniff`. `default-src 'none'; sandbox` gives a directly-navigated file no capabilities at all, which is the only way one of these can do harm — an `<img>` embed does not execute script. Writes get 405 rather than falling through to a 404 that suggests the path is wrong. The other half is the separate origin, which is the real fix, because the origin is the whole unit of trust in a browser. That needs a hostname and a certificate, which live outside this repository, so what is here is the switch: `UPLOADS_BASE_URL`, sent to the frontend at runtime through `/api/config` and joined onto stored paths by `uploadUrl`. Empty means the app's own origin, which is the default and what local development has, so nothing changes until it is pointed somewhere. Stored paths stay site-relative. A stored value outlives any hostname baked into it, and rewriting them would be a migration to undo the day the hostname changes. Runtime rather than built in, so one image serves every environment — the same reason `paypalClientId` and `demoMode` are already there. `UPLOADS_BASE_URL` has a line in `docker-compose.prod.yml` while still empty, deliberately: a Portainer stack variable with no line there is substituted into the file and never reaches the container, which is exactly how `UPLOADS_DIR` went missing on 2026-08-23. Unset warns at boot, in the same shape as the admin gate — a working configuration with one defence switched off is worth saying out loud. Set without a scheme is refused outright, because a bare hostname joins onto a stored path as if it were relative and breaks every image on the site rather than failing visibly. The compose guard now resolves `${VAR:-default}` to its default, which is what the container actually receives when the stack variable behind it is unset. A bare `${VAR}` is still left opaque, so a required variable referenced that way goes on counting as present — that check is about the line existing, not about the stack being filled in. Closes #103 |
||
|
bermudalamb
|
9bb3cc86b6 |
feat(frontend): give order history a page of its own (#121)
The account modal had accumulated: a profile line, a name form, two collapsed panels for changing email and password, two consent switches, an order table and four controls. The table was the piece that fitted worst, being the only tabular data in a 700px dialog whose body is capped at 70vh. The scroll={{ x: 'max-content' }} already on it was a workaround for being in the wrong container rather than a layout choice.
It moves to /orders, an ordinary page in the same Routes block as /cart and /privacy, rather than another entry in MODAL_ROUTES. Order history is a list you read, like the cart, not a dialog you dismiss. A modal at /account/orders would have been the smaller change and was rejected: it inherits the same width and the same scroll cap, so it moves the table without giving it anything.
The page shell follows Cart.tsx, which is the established shape here: a Layout with a Header carrying Back to Shop and the title, and the same guard sending a signed-out visitor to /login. The account modal keeps a View order history button where the table used to be, because that is where a customer looks for it.
One thing changes rather than moves. The old effect caught a failed load with a toast and left orders as an empty array. The toast faded and the empty table did not, so from then on a customer whose request failed saw exactly what a customer with no orders saw, and the page asserted something false. Loading, failed and empty are now three distinct states, and the failed one carries a Retry: a transient failure would otherwise strand someone on a page that needs a full reload to recover.
OrdersBody sits at module level rather than nested inside Orders(). A function declared inside a component counts toward that component's cognitive complexity, which is what made Customers() hard to bring back under the threshold in #81.
The two assertions in account-modal.spec.ts that looked for the text "Order History" inside the modal are updated to look for the link, not deleted. They were the only coverage that the account view still offers any route to the orders, which is exactly what this change could have silently broken.
Verification, against a real backend and database: five new tests covering the signed-out redirect, the empty state, Back to Shop, the link from My Account, and that the page renders as a page rather than a modal over the storefront - that last one is what would catch /orders being added to MODAL_ROUTES and quietly undoing the change. The full suite goes from 100 to 105 passing with no new failures; the three that fail did so before this branch and fail identically on main. tsc and the production build are clean, ESLint reports no errors.
Closes #121
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
a700597440 |
refactor: standardise antd imports and remove the avoidable any (#65)
Stage 1 of #65: this issue's original two lists. The type-checked gate it also owns follows in later stages. Nine files imported antd from the barrel while the rest of the codebase used deep imports from antd/es. Both resolve to the same modules under antd v5 and Vite, so this is not the tree-shaking problem it would have been under v4 — the cost was that a documented convention had two spellings, and nobody reading a file could tell whether its style was deliberate or just old. Eighty-two imports converted, and every antd/es path was checked to exist before generating any of them rather than trusting a name-mangling rule. The three `client: any` parameters in cartCheckout are now PoolClient. These functions run inside a transaction, and `any` removed exactly the check that would catch a pool-versus-client mix-up — which in this codebase means a query silently running outside the transaction it was meant to be part of, on the path that takes money. publicCustomer took `any` and now takes a CustomerRow describing what it actually reads. Typed as its own shape rather than the whole table so that adding a column later — a password hash, a token, an internal note — cannot quietly start being echoed back to a customer. The three `(window as any).paypal` casts are replaced by a declared interface for the injected SDK. It is deliberately narrow: it describes the three things this app calls, not the whole SDK, because a wider guess would be fiction and a wrong shape typed confidently is worse than an honest cast. The property is optional, since the SDK is absent until its script has loaded — which is the check both call sites already make. Verified: 141 unit, 169 integration and 94 end-to-end passing. The end-to-end run is the one that matters here — an antd import migration can build cleanly and still break at runtime through styles or context, so a green tsc proves less than it appears to. Lint drops from 8 warnings to 4 in the backend and 30 to 27 in the frontend, all of them the no-explicit-any this change removed. As a side effect the no-unsafe count that later stages exist to clear falls from 259 to 216 in the backend and 73 to 67 in the frontend, measured rather than estimated. Refs #65 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
71cbd142c3 |
fix: address the final review of the error boundaries (#62)
Five findings from a whole-branch review, two of which mattered. The catalogue boundary could not be recovered by the very controls it exists to keep alive. When the item grid threw, the header, filter chips and Clear filters stayed mounted — that was the point — but clicking Clear filters only changed the URL. A boundary does not reset on a client-side state change, so the fallback went on rendering over a catalogue that would by then have loaded perfectly well, and the only offered action reloaded the same failing URL. The shop read as permanently broken, which is the failure this whole change exists to prevent, reintroduced one level down. ErrorBoundary now takes an optional resetKey and clears itself when it changes; the catalogue boundary passes the filter key. The page and modal boundaries deliberately do not take one, because their escapes are hard navigations that remount the tree already — recorded on the prop so nobody completes the pattern by symmetry. The client-error endpoint could fill the disk. It is unauthenticated, each accepted report wrote about 8.7 KB, and Docker's default json-file driver has no size cap — so the rate limiter bounded a render loop, as its comment claims, but not a few hundred cheap source addresses. Stack and component stack now truncate at 1000 rather than 4000, which is still around fifteen frames and cuts the worst case to under 3 KB, and the QA compose file caps and rotates the log. Production is a Portainer stack outside this repository and needs the same option applied there; noted in the design doc rather than left implied. Three smaller things. A falsy thrown value defeated the boundary entirely: throw null is legal, and branching on the error object alone treated it as no error, re-rendered the children, threw again, and would have taken the root down — a blank page, the one outcome this is all here to avoid. The boundary now tracks hasError separately and synthesises a real Error for non-Error throws. The modal fallback announced its title twice to a screen reader, once as the dialog's name and once as the heading inside it, so the redundant dialog title is gone. And the design doc claimed the development-only detail shows the component stack when it only ever showed the message; corrected, with a note that the stack still reaches the server log, which is where it is useful. Verified after all five: backend lint 0 errors, 144 integration tests, frontend lint 0 errors and 31 warnings, 87 end-to-end tests, all against a freshly created database. Refs #62 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
f156cecd87 |
feat(frontend): mount error boundaries at the root, the item grid and the modals (#62)
Three mount points, so a render error costs the smallest part of the page it can. The catalogue boundary is the one that earns its keep. The likeliest throw in this app is a component rendering data from the API, and the item grid renders the most of it per page — contained there, the header, cart badge, filters and footer all survive, so a customer can still navigate instead of being handed one dead page. The modal boundary exists because the modal-route arrangement couples two independent trees. /account, /login and the rest render as modals over the storefront as a backdrop, so without a boundary between them a throw in Account blanks the storefront behind it and a throw in the storefront takes the open modal with it. One boundary separates them in both directions. Every escape action is a hard navigation rather than a Link. This is worth stating because the obvious implementation is wrong: a boundary does not reset when the route changes, so a Link would change the URL and go on rendering the fallback, which reads as the app being permanently broken. ErrorFallback changed too, outside this change's original scope and for a reason worth recording. antd's Result renders its title as a plain div with no heading semantics, so a page whose entire content is an error message offered a screen-reader user navigating by headings nothing at all to find. The title is now wrapped in Typography.Title. The tests assert a heading role and were right to; the component was what needed fixing, not the assertion. DevThrow throws on ?boom=<scope> and is mounted only behind import.meta.env.DEV, so Rollup drops it from a production build. Checked in both directions rather than trusted: the dev server serves it, and a production bundle greps to zero occurrences of its marker. A gate that is silently always-off looks identical to one that works. Verified: 87 end-to-end tests pass, 4 of them new — each boundary catches rather than blanking, the header survives a catalogue throw, the storefront survives a modal throw, and the report is observed reaching /api/client-errors on the wire rather than assumed. Build clean, lint 0 errors and 31 warnings. Refs #62 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
5f9172512c |
refactor: clear the 85 minutes of technical debt (#81)
Thirteen of SonarQube's fourteen code smells, with the fourteenth argued as a false positive rather than coded around. Four of these were not stylistic. The Remove button in Cart's List.Item actions array carried no key, so React could not match it across renders and rebuilt it on every cart render. The cart, customer-auth and favorites providers each passed a freshly allocated object as their context value, which re-renders every consumer whenever the provider renders, cart or session unchanged — and these three wrap the entire storefront, so the fan-out was the whole tree. Two of them also rebuilt a Set on every render for good measure. All four now memoized on the values they actually derive from. The four cognitive-complexity findings wanted real restructuring rather than suppression. parseItemFilters splits into one helper per field, leaving the function with the order those helpers run in and the single rule that spans two fields; the order is preserved exactly, because a query wrong in two ways reports the first field and rearranging the calls would change which error a caller sees. adminCategories' PUT extracts the parent resolution — the existence check and the cycle check — into a resolver that returns the refusal rather than sending it. App's four-way render chain becomes a Catalogue component, which also removes two of the nested ternaries. Customers' confirm dialog moves to module level, since a function's cognitive complexity counts everything declared inside it and that dialog branches on `disabling` five times. The rest were mechanical: two more nested ternaries — a status-colour lookup and a pluralisation helper — and one type assertion that asserted the type the expression already had. Left alone: S6478 on CategoryTreeSelect's popupRender. That is antd's render prop, called as a function and spliced in, never mounted as a component type, so the destroy-the-subtree failure the rule describes cannot happen. Marked false positive in SonarQube with that reasoning rather than contorting the component around a rule that misread it. Verified rather than assumed. Backend unit 78 pass, integration 134 pass, end-to-end 83 pass, both workspaces build clean. ESLint warnings drop from 35 to 31 with no new file warning — the same React and SonarJS rules #60 turned on are what surfaced this backlog in the first place. Refs #81 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalamb
|
5ebb366074 |
feat(auth): open sign-in and registration as modals over the page behind (#50)
/login, /register and /forgot-password rendered bare cards with no site header. They linked to each other and nowhere else, so a customer who clicked Log in from the storefront and changed their mind had no way back except the browser's back button. All four auth routes are now modals over the page the customer was already on, reusing the backdrop-location arrangement from #51: a direct visit or a link from an email opens over the storefront, so closing always lands somewhere real. They remain real routes, because /reset-password links to /login and customers may have bookmarks. Signing in or registering now returns the customer to the page behind, signed in, rather than moving them to /account. Someone who signs in while browsing wants to carry on browsing, and this is already how the cart and favorites prompts behave when they resume an interrupted action. The larger half of this is removing the duplication. Signing in existed twice — as these routes and again inside the prompt shown when a signed-out visitor adds to the cart or favorites something — and the two had already drifted. There were three different wordings of the marketing consent in circulation: the register page's, a shorter one in the prompt, and the string the server actually stores. The server keeps that text verbatim so the consent record says what the customer saw, which none of the three did. Both callers now render one shared AuthForm whose checkbox is the exact string the server records, and a test asserts that wording so it cannot drift again silently. Steps within the auth flow replace rather than push, so switching between tabs or stepping to password recovery leaves the whole detour as a single history entry and closing returns to where it started instead of walking back through every tab that was looked at. The privacy policy link opens in a new tab: following it in place would discard a part-filled signup form, and /privacy still has no way back of its own until #52. Test changes follow from the destination change rather than being incidental. Nineteen assertions across seven specs waited for /account after signing in; they now assert the header shows a signed-in customer, which is the condition actually being waited for. Modal submits are scoped to their dialog, because the storefront behind now offers a Log in button of its own and an unscoped locator matched both. Assertions that follow a server round-trip were given a realistic timeout — the 5s default is too tight for a bcrypt hash plus re-rendering the storefront behind the modal. Verified with 83 end-to-end tests, all passing, and type checking clean. No backend changes. Closes #50 |
||
|
bermudalamb
|
91485b6ac1 |
feat(account): open My Account as a modal over the page behind it (#51)
/account had no header and no links of any kind, so once a customer opened it the only way back to the storefront was the browser's back button or editing the URL. It is now a modal rendered over whatever the customer was looking at, while staying a real route. Opening it from the header pushes /account and names the current page as the backdrop, so closing returns there with filters intact, and the browser's Back button does the same thing as the close control. Entering /account directly — a bookmark, the link in a verification email, or the redirect after registering — has no page behind it and falls back to the storefront, so closing always lands somewhere real. Keeping it a route means the URL still works: bookmarkable, shareable, and refreshable with the view still open, which the header link and the four post-authentication redirects already depend on. Deleting an account now clears the session as well. Previously it removed the account server-side and navigated home without touching the auth context, so the header went on offering "My Account" for an account that no longer existed until the next reload. That was always wrong, but the modal makes it visible rather than merely stale, because the storefront is rendered behind and the wrong header is on screen throughout. The modal body is capped and scrolls, and the order history table scrolls within itself, so the view survives a phone without pushing its own title and close control off-screen. Also scopes the account switch locator in the favorites spec to the modal, since the storefront now renders behind the account view and has a theme switch of its own, and gives the post-registration wait a realistic timeout — it waits on a bcrypt round-trip rather than a render, and the 5s default was surfacing as a flake on whichever test lost the race under parallel load. Closes #51 |
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
f626f27e75 |
feat: favorite items and notify when a favorite is sold (#34)
Customers can favorite and unfavorite items from the storefront, opt in to being told when a favorite is sold to someone else, and manage that preference from their account page. The opt-in is a consent of its own rather than the existing marketing flag. Being told that a specific item you asked about has gone is a narrower thing than agreeing to marketing, and folding one into the other would leave marketing_consent_text no longer describing what was actually agreed to. It is recorded the same way as the marketing consent — flag, timestamp, and the exact wording shown — and accepting it does not set marketing_consent. The prompt appears only after a customer has actually favorited something, so the reason for asking is concrete rather than an abstract marketing ask, and it says plainly that it is separate from marketing email. Declining keeps the favorite. Notifications fire when an item reaches sold, either through checkout or an admin marking it sold, and never to the buyer — telling someone the item they just bought is unavailable reads as a bug. Reserved is deliberately not a trigger: reservations expire and get released, so a "gone" email would often be about an item still for sale. Disabled accounts are excluded, per #33. completeCheckout now returns the sold item ids and the buyer so its three call sites can notify after COMMIT. Sending inside the transaction would email people about a sale that then rolled back, and would hold the transaction open for SMTP. Each message is sent independently so one bad address cannot stop the rest, and the sale has already succeeded regardless. Favoriting while signed out opens the existing inline register/login modal, exactly as Add to Cart does, and completes the favorite on success. Also fixes a latent bug in the same component: while the session was still resolving, `customer` is null for a signed-in visitor too, so clicking Add to Cart or the new heart in that window prompted them to sign in again. Both now ignore clicks until the session has resolved, and the control shows as loading meanwhile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
db7c61c89d |
feat: customer password reset via email round-trip (#32)
Adds "Forgot password?" to the login page, a request page, and a reset page reached by a one-hour, single-use token delivered by email. Reuses customer_tokens with a new password_reset kind alongside verify_email. The request endpoint always answers 200, whether or not the address has an account, so it cannot be used to test addresses for membership. Note /register still reveals existence through its 409 on a duplicate, so this protection is currently partial; closing that is its own change. Completing a reset deletes every session for that customer. A reset prompted by a compromise has to evict the intruder, and leaving a 30-day cookie alive would defeat the point. It also marks the address verified, since receiving the mail is exactly what verification proves, and supersedes any outstanding token so an older link in the inbox cannot be resurrected. Introduces the first rate limiting in the codebase, on the request endpoint only. The limiter is keyed on caller *and* submitted address: keying on IP alone would let one person lock out everyone behind the same proxy, and everything arrives via Nginx Proxy Manager. Applying that same limiter to the reset endpoint, which carries no address, collapsed every caller into one shared bucket -- so that endpoint is deliberately unlimited instead, protected by a 32-byte single-use token whose bcrypt work only runs after the token matches. The e2e tests read the issued token directly from Postgres rather than through a test-support endpoint. An endpoint returning a reset token for an arbitrary address is account takeover for every customer if it is ever reachable, and an environment gate is thin protection against that. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
f537314259 |
fix(admin): theme, American English, and inventory/reservation tooling (#27)
Seven reported items, of which the first four had two root causes. The active tab was invisible in dark mode because colorPrimary was hardcoded to #1a1a1a in both themes. The accent now inverts with the theme, and colorTextLightSolid inverts with it, or a near-white accent would get antd's default white label and disappear. The Category tab, Tag tab, and item-form category selector ignored the theme entirely. antd declares main: lib/index.js and module: es/index.js, so importing from 'antd' resolves to the ES build while 'antd/lib/...' loads the CommonJS one — two copies, two React contexts, and no ConfigProvider for anything deep-imported. Switching those files to antd/es/* keeps the deep-import convention and shares the instance. This was introduced by my own use of the lib path; es is correct under Vite. Two storefront components had the same latent bug. "Colour" is now "Color". The Customers tab shows how many items each customer is holding, as a link opening the item list with a Release button. Release mirrors the customer's own cart removal — drop the cart row, return the item to available, guarded on 'reserved' so it can never resurrect a sold item — and deliberately sends no email about an action the customer did not take. The count is a subquery rather than another join, which would have multiplied rows and inflated order_count and total_spent_cents. The Inventory tab filters by category, tags, price, and status, reusing the storefront's parser and query builder so the two cannot drift. Reserved is one option in a Status filter rather than a standalone toggle. Also fixes two defects the screenshots exposed: the reserved-count link bubbled to the row handler and opened the customer drawer behind the dialog, and .admin-category-node had no CSS at all, so the tree node name, item count, and actions ran together as one string. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
77e58c0b92 |
fix(admin): confirm writes succeeded and allow inline category creation (#23)
Reported from testing: the item form said "Item added" for a save that never happened. saveItem and the other admin calls returned res.json() without checking res.ok, so a 4xx/5xx resolved normally and every caller reported success for a write the server had rejected. That is worse than failing outright, because nothing prompts the user to look for the missing row. All admin calls now throw on a non-OK response, and the handlers report the error, keep the form open so entered values survive, and only claim success once the server has accepted the write. Mark sold/available previously did nothing visible on failure at all. Categories can now be created from the item form, as tags already could. Previously a category that did not exist yet meant abandoning a half-filled form for the Categories tab. New categories are created at the top level; nesting stays in the Categories tab. The control lives in its own component: inline, every keystroke re-rendered the whole Inventory component and rebuilt the category tree, which visibly jittered the open popup. It sits above the tree rather than below it, where a long list both hid it and made its position depend on the list's measured height. The tree no longer expands everything on open, which does not scale past a screenful; it has search instead. The app now honours prefers-reduced-motion by disabling antd transitions, and the e2e suite runs with that preference set. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5
|
b7c8c37447 |
fix: add the missing /verify-email page
Verification emails linked to /verify-email?token=..., but no such route existed in main.tsx and nothing in the frontend ever called POST /api/customers/verify-email. The SPA catch-all served index.html, no route matched, and the page rendered blank -- so the token was never redeemed and accounts stayed unverified forever. The gap was invisible until SMTP was configured, because no verification email had ever actually been delivered. Adds VerifyEmail.tsx (verifying / verified / failed states), a verifyEmail call in customerApi, and the route. The request is pinned to a single firing via a ref: the endpoint deletes the token on success, so StrictMode's double effect invocation in dev would otherwise overwrite the success state with "invalid or expired token". Verified end to end against a local stack: a real token flips customers.email_verified to true and is consumed from customer_tokens. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
bermudalamb
|
9ab689e624 | feat: add customer cart with expiry, shipping addresses with USPS validation, and multi-item PayPal checkout | ||
|
bermudalamb
|
9be4986dd3 | Initial commit: redefined-designs storefront |