Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
bermudalamb 5ebb366074 feat(auth): open sign-in and registration as modals over the page behind (#50)
/login, /register and /forgot-password rendered bare cards with no site header. They linked to each other and nowhere else, so a customer who clicked Log in from the storefront and changed their mind had no way back except the browser's back button. All four auth routes are now modals over the page the customer was already on, reusing the backdrop-location arrangement from #51: a direct visit or a link from an email opens over the storefront, so closing always lands somewhere real. They remain real routes, because /reset-password links to /login and customers may have bookmarks.

Signing in or registering now returns the customer to the page behind, signed in, rather than moving them to /account. Someone who signs in while browsing wants to carry on browsing, and this is already how the cart and favorites prompts behave when they resume an interrupted action.

The larger half of this is removing the duplication. Signing in existed twice — as these routes and again inside the prompt shown when a signed-out visitor adds to the cart or favorites something — and the two had already drifted. There were three different wordings of the marketing consent in circulation: the register page's, a shorter one in the prompt, and the string the server actually stores. The server keeps that text verbatim so the consent record says what the customer saw, which none of the three did. Both callers now render one shared AuthForm whose checkbox is the exact string the server records, and a test asserts that wording so it cannot drift again silently.

Steps within the auth flow replace rather than push, so switching between tabs or stepping to password recovery leaves the whole detour as a single history entry and closing returns to where it started instead of walking back through every tab that was looked at.

The privacy policy link opens in a new tab: following it in place would discard a part-filled signup form, and /privacy still has no way back of its own until #52.

Test changes follow from the destination change rather than being incidental. Nineteen assertions across seven specs waited for /account after signing in; they now assert the header shows a signed-in customer, which is the condition actually being waited for. Modal submits are scoped to their dialog, because the storefront behind now offers a Log in button of its own and an unscoped locator matched both. Assertions that follow a server round-trip were given a realistic timeout — the 5s default is too tight for a bcrypt hash plus re-rendering the storefront behind the modal.

Verified with 83 end-to-end tests, all passing, and type checking clean. No backend changes.

Closes #50
2026-08-18 17:24:28 -05:00
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5 13c010ff51 feat(admin): disable and re-enable customer accounts (#33)
SonarQube Analysis / sonarqube (pull_request) Successful in 3m0s
Tests / backend-unit (pull_request) Successful in 48s
Tests / frontend-e2e (pull_request) Failing after 9m41s
Adds customers.disabled_at, admin disable/enable endpoints, a Status
column and toggle on the Customers tab, and enforcement across every
path that authenticates.

Enforcement lives in attachCustomer, which previously validated only the
session token and its expiry and never read the customer row. Register,
login and password reset all mint sessions, so a single check in the
middleware covers every path rather than three separate ones — and it
means an existing rd_session cookie stops working at once instead of at
its 30-day expiry. Disabling also deletes the sessions outright, so
eviction does not wait for the next request.

Disabling releases the items the customer was holding, in the same
transaction. A disabled account cannot check out, so leaving its
reservations would keep one-of-a-kind stock off the storefront for up to
the cart expiry window for no purpose. Guarded on 'reserved' so a sold
item is never resurrected. Re-enabling restores sign-in but does not give
the items back — they may since have sold.

Sign-in returns an explicit 403 rather than a generic credential failure.
That does confirm the address has an account, which sits awkwardly beside
the deliberately non-enumerating reset in #32; the trade was made the
other way because a disabled customer told "invalid email or password"
resets their password, succeeds, is still locked out, and concludes the
site is broken. The check runs only after the password verifies, so it is
not a bulk membership oracle, and /register already reveals existence.

A reset token issued before the disable no longer mints a session, and no
new tokens are issued for a disabled account — while still answering 200,
so that endpoint stays non-enumerating.

Self-service GDPR export and deletion are blocked along with everything
else, so those requests now need servicing by hand. Worth checking the
privacy policy does not promise unconditional self-service.

Also fixes an unrelated bug the e2e run surfaced: the admin inventory
fired a request per keystroke in the price fields with no sequencing, so
an older response could land after a newer one and repaint stale rows.
Only the most recently issued request may now set state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 10:48:28 -05:00