The quality gate was red on one condition only — new_security_hotspots_reviewed at 75 against a threshold of 100 — and the outstanding hotspot was admin.ts's `${ADMIN_ITEM_SELECT} WHERE i.id = $1`.
Worth being exact about what was wrong with it, because it was not what it looked like. The value was already parameterized: itemId was bound as $1, travelled through the driver's separate parameter channel, and never entered the query text. What was interpolated was a module constant containing no caller data. S2077 fires on the template literal rather than on the value, because the rule cannot tell a constant from a request field — and neither, at a glance, can a person reading it.
So the fix is not to parameterize something already parameterized. It is to stop interpolating at query call sites at all, which turns a property somebody has to verify into one they can see. Every query whose shape is fixed is now a named constant and every such call passes an identifier: ADMIN_ITEM_BY_ID for the two admin routes, PUBLIC_ITEM_BY_ID, LINK_LIST, and the two draft-queue shapes. Seven interpolating call sites become three.
The three that remain cannot become constants and now say so rather than looking like ones nobody got to. admin.ts and items.ts build their WHERE at run time from buildItemFilterSql, whose fragments are string literals whose only interpolations are placeholder indices; that reasoning was already written down and is unchanged. draftingWorker interpolates a table name, and this is the one query here that genuinely cannot be parameterized in any form — a bound parameter is a value, and Postgres will not accept an identifier as one, so the choice is interpolation or nothing. What makes it safe is the closed 'categories' | 'tags' union, and the comment now says that instead of merely asserting there is nothing to worry about.
Also clears the project's only open Sonar issue, S1854 on adminUploadLinks, which #260 introduced and which I had deferred as a tidiness point. It was more than that: outcome was initialised at its declaration and assigned the same value again in the catch, which made two different failures look like one. A template that will not render, or a stored template that cannot be loaded, is not an SMTP problem, and reporting it as "not configured" sent the admin looking in the wrong place. The SMTP-rejection conflation that was actually agreed stays, and is now the only thing that catch conflates.
Closes#294
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The revoke route's RETURNING clause omitted contact_email while its result was typed as UploadLinkRow, which declares the field as present. No user-visible effect since the response was never checked for it, but the type asserted something the query did not actually return. Added the column so the two agree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Creating a link now requires a valid email address and mails the link to it, which is the whole point: getting a link to a contributor was previously a copy-and-paste into whatever the admin happened to use.
The send is awaited and its outcome reported, unlike every other sender in this codebase, which fires and forgets because nobody is waiting on the answer. Here somebody is. The admin is looking at the screen, and whether they now have to send the link by hand is exactly the thing they need to know — and QA blocks delivery to any address outside MAIL_ALLOWLIST by design, so a link that was never emailed would otherwise look precisely like one that was.
A send that could not happen does not roll the link back. The token is displayed exactly once, so a rollback would leave the admin retrying and holding a different link, discarding work that had succeeded. They end up with a usable link and an honest statement about delivery instead.
One inaccuracy left deliberately: an SMTP rejection is reported as skipped-unconfigured rather than a fourth outcome of its own. The distinction is real but nothing consumes it, and the admin's next action is identical either way.
Also updates the other integration tests that created a link with only a label, since an address is now required, and adds the uploadLink template key that GET /api/admin/email-templates was missing from its list — an omission left by the template's addition in the prior commit on this branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The check is ordered ahead of uploadImages, for the same reason requireUsableLink is: a refused submission must write zero bytes. Ordering it after would accept the upload, store the files and then throw them away, which is the expensive half of the work the ceiling exists to prevent. A test asserts nothing is stored.
503, not 403. The sender has done nothing wrong, their link is fine, and the condition clears by itself as the window rolls — so the link stays usable and works again the moment there is room.
The ceiling never touches the admin upload path, which has its own test. Intake being throttled is an inconvenience; the shop being unable to add its own stock is an outage.
reset-ceiling is declared above /:id/revoke because Express matches in order and would otherwise read it as an id and try to revoke a link named "reset-ceiling". That has its own test too.
The per-link alert is a named function rather than the inline IIFE the plan wrote. routesAreWrapped.test.ts flags any async inside a route registration not directly wrapped in asyncRoute, and it cannot tell an inner IIFE from an unwrapped handler — nor should it have to. The guard caught this, and the extraction reads better than what it rejected.
Backend now 373 unit and 337 integration, all passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three routes behind the admin gate: list, create, revoke. A link is named because provenance matters more than convenience — when one is shared further than intended the question is which one, and every submission will record the link it arrived through, so revoking kills that link rather than the feature.
The token is returned by exactly one response and is unrecoverable afterwards, which is why the admin screen has to present it as a one-time reveal. The listing selects its columns explicitly rather than `SELECT *`, so `token_hash` cannot reach a response the moment somebody adds a convenience — and a test asserts the listing carries neither the token nor the digest.
An absent `maxSubmissions` gets a bounded default of 25 rather than null. Absent means nobody decided; an explicit null means unlimited, which is a decision visible in the request. Reading absent as unlimited is what would quietly make every link unbounded, and the common case is the one that has to be safe.
Revoking is idempotent through COALESCE, and a test asserts the second call returns the *same* timestamp rather than merely succeeding. The useful fact is when access ended, and a button that errors on a double-click teaches people to distrust it — which is the last thing wanted on the control that contains a leak.
Mounted above the `/api/admin` catch-all, which would otherwise swallow the path, and behind requireAdminGate on the router itself per the reasoning in middleware/adminGate.ts.
Lint caught me reintroducing something this codebase had already solved: I wrote `.replace(/\/+$/, '')` to trim PUBLIC_URL, and app.ts carried a hand-written loop with a comment explaining that exact regex backtracks. Rather than duplicate the loop, trimTrailingSlashes moved to utils.ts and both callers now share it.
Backend: 272 integration (9 new), 308 unit, lint back to its 6 pre-existing warnings, build clean.
Ref #222
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5