intake.integration.test.ts, intakeCeiling.integration.test.ts and uploadLinks.integration.test.ts all create upload links, and since #260 that now sends real mail. env.setup.ts never clears SMTP_USER, SMTP_PASSWORD or MAIL_ALLOWLIST, so with those inherited from a developer's shell these three files opened live TLS connections to smtp.gmail.com:465 and, with no allowlist set, actually delivered to sarah@example.com. This is the exact hazard the "Do not add one back" comment in tests/unit/mailOutcome.test.ts already warns about, reintroduced at the integration layer.
All three now mock ../../src/mailer the same way accountDetails.integration.test.ts, favorites.integration.test.ts and resendVerification.integration.test.ts already do. uploadLinks.integration.test.ts is the one place that needs to see specific MailOutcome values come back through the route, so its two outcome tests were restructured to drive the mock's return value directly (sentMail.mockResolvedValueOnce(...)) instead of threading SMTP_USER/MAIL_ALLOWLIST through the real sendMail. That is a cleaner test anyway: it isolates the route's job (reporting whatever outcome sendMail returns) from sendMail's own skip logic, which is already covered hermetically by mailOutcome.test.ts and mailAllowlist.test.ts.
Also addresses the related minor finding that nothing asserted the mail actually carried the working link: required: ['submitUrl'] on the template only guards that the placeholder is present in the body, not that the route supplied a correct value for it. A new test in uploadLinks.integration.test.ts inspects the mock's captured call and asserts the html contains the created token's /submit/ URL, and covers the three submissionsAllowed phrasings (a numeric cap, a cap of exactly one, and uncapped).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Creating a link now requires a valid email address and mails the link to it, which is the whole point: getting a link to a contributor was previously a copy-and-paste into whatever the admin happened to use.
The send is awaited and its outcome reported, unlike every other sender in this codebase, which fires and forgets because nobody is waiting on the answer. Here somebody is. The admin is looking at the screen, and whether they now have to send the link by hand is exactly the thing they need to know — and QA blocks delivery to any address outside MAIL_ALLOWLIST by design, so a link that was never emailed would otherwise look precisely like one that was.
A send that could not happen does not roll the link back. The token is displayed exactly once, so a rollback would leave the admin retrying and holding a different link, discarding work that had succeeded. They end up with a usable link and an honest statement about delivery instead.
One inaccuracy left deliberately: an SMTP rejection is reported as skipped-unconfigured rather than a fourth outcome of its own. The distinction is real but nothing consumes it, and the admin's next action is identical either way.
Also updates the other integration tests that created a link with only a label, since an address is now required, and adds the uploadLink template key that GET /api/admin/email-templates was missing from its list — an omission left by the template's addition in the prior commit on this branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three routes behind the admin gate: list, create, revoke. A link is named because provenance matters more than convenience — when one is shared further than intended the question is which one, and every submission will record the link it arrived through, so revoking kills that link rather than the feature.
The token is returned by exactly one response and is unrecoverable afterwards, which is why the admin screen has to present it as a one-time reveal. The listing selects its columns explicitly rather than `SELECT *`, so `token_hash` cannot reach a response the moment somebody adds a convenience — and a test asserts the listing carries neither the token nor the digest.
An absent `maxSubmissions` gets a bounded default of 25 rather than null. Absent means nobody decided; an explicit null means unlimited, which is a decision visible in the request. Reading absent as unlimited is what would quietly make every link unbounded, and the common case is the one that has to be safe.
Revoking is idempotent through COALESCE, and a test asserts the second call returns the *same* timestamp rather than merely succeeding. The useful fact is when access ended, and a button that errors on a double-click teaches people to distrust it — which is the last thing wanted on the control that contains a leak.
Mounted above the `/api/admin` catch-all, which would otherwise swallow the path, and behind requireAdminGate on the router itself per the reasoning in middleware/adminGate.ts.
Lint caught me reintroducing something this codebase had already solved: I wrote `.replace(/\/+$/, '')` to trim PUBLIC_URL, and app.ts carried a hand-written loop with a comment explaining that exact regex backtracks. Rather than duplicate the loop, trimTrailingSlashes moved to utils.ts and both callers now share it.
Backend: 272 integration (9 new), 308 unit, lint back to its 6 pre-existing warnings, build clean.
Ref #222
bermudalambandClaude Opus 5