test(perf): stop hashing test passwords at production cost (#242)
The integration suite registers around thirty-five customers and asserts nothing about any of their hashes, yet paid bcrypt cost 12 for every one. bcryptjs is a pure-JS implementation, so it pays that cost several times over compared with a native build, and hashing was most of the suite's wall clock. On a contended runner it pushed adminInventory.integration.test.ts past its twenty-second timeout, which then surfaced as a foreign key violation somewhere else entirely — the test timed out, jest moved on, beforeEach truncated, and the still-in-flight registration wrote a token for a customer that had just been deleted. Measured rather than asserted, warm run against warm run with only the constant changed: 34.5s at cost 12, 9.8s at cost 4. Three and a half times faster, about twenty-five seconds off every integration run, with all 263 tests passing either way. The first attempt at that measurement was wrong and worth recording. Comparing a cold run at cost 4 against a warm run at cost 12 made the change look like a 36% regression-shaped improvement of the wrong size; the difference was ts-jest and Postgres warming up, not the cost factor. Both numbers above are second runs, and the cost-12 figure was taken twice — 34.3s and 34.5s — before being believed. Deliberately not configurable. An environment variable here would be a way to weaken password hashing in production by misconfiguration, and nothing needs to tune it. The only route to the cheap cost is NODE_ENV=test, which a deployed container would announce anyway by refusing to serve the built frontend, since app.ts gates static serving on the same value. A setting that quietly degrades a security property should be unreachable rather than warned about, which is the reasoning that already made DEMO_MODE strict. `hashRoundsFor` is pure and separately tested because the failure it guards against is silent: only the exact string 'test' earns the cheap cost, and an unset NODE_ENV gets the strong one, so the dangerous direction has to be asked for explicitly. Both constants are pinned by assertions too — without that the branch tests pass while the numbers drift to something useless. Closes #242
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@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
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/**
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* How expensive a password hash is, and why that differs under test.
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*
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* bcrypt's cost is exponential: each step doubles the work. Twelve is the right
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* number for real passwords and the wrong one for a test suite that registers
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* around thirty-five customers and asserts nothing about any of their hashes.
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* `bcryptjs` is a pure-JS implementation, so it pays that cost several times
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* over compared with a native build, and the integration suite spent most of
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* its wall clock there. On a loaded runner that pushed
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* adminInventory.integration.test.ts past its twenty-second timeout, which read
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* as a foreign key violation somewhere else entirely — see #242.
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*
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* Deliberately not configurable.
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* ------------------------------
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* An environment variable here would be a way to weaken password hashing in
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* production by misconfiguration, and nothing needs to tune this. The only way
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* to reach the cheap cost is NODE_ENV=test, which a deployed container would
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* also announce loudly by refusing to serve the built frontend — app.ts gates
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* static file serving on the same value. A setting that quietly degrades a
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* security property should be unreachable rather than merely warned about,
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* which is the same reasoning that made DEMO_MODE strict.
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*/
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/** What real passwords are hashed with, everywhere that is not a test run. */
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export const PRODUCTION_ROUNDS = 12;
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/**
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* What tests hash with. 2^8 = 256 times less work than production.
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*
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* Four is bcrypt's own floor, so this is as cheap as the algorithm allows. It
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* is a fine number for a suite whose passwords are fixtures; it would be a
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* serious defect anywhere a real one is stored.
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*/
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export const TEST_ROUNDS = 4;
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/**
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* The cost for an environment, from NODE_ENV.
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*
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* Pure and exported for its test: this is the whole of the policy, and the
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* failure it guards against is silent. Only the exact string 'test' earns the
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* cheap cost — an unset NODE_ENV, or anything else, gets the strong one, so the
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* dangerous direction requires saying so explicitly.
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*/
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export function hashRoundsFor(nodeEnv: string | undefined): number {
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return nodeEnv === 'test' ? TEST_ROUNDS : PRODUCTION_ROUNDS;
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}
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/** Resolved once at import: NODE_ENV does not change while the process runs. */
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export const PASSWORD_HASH_ROUNDS = hashRoundsFor(process.env.NODE_ENV);
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import { Router, Request, Response } from 'express';
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import { Router, Request, Response } from 'express';
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import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
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import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
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import { PASSWORD_HASH_ROUNDS } from '../passwordHashing';
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import crypto from 'node:crypto';
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import crypto from 'node:crypto';
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import { pool, requireRow } from '../db';
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import { pool, requireRow } from '../db';
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import { requireCustomer } from '../middleware/customerAuth';
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import { requireCustomer } from '../middleware/customerAuth';
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@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ router.post('/register', asyncRoute(async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
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const { rows: existing } = await pool.query<IdRow>(`SELECT id FROM customers WHERE email = $1`, [normalizedEmail]);
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const { rows: existing } = await pool.query<IdRow>(`SELECT id FROM customers WHERE email = $1`, [normalizedEmail]);
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if (existing.length) return res.status(409).json({ error: 'an account with this email already exists' });
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if (existing.length) return res.status(409).json({ error: 'an account with this email already exists' });
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const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 12);
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const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(password, PASSWORD_HASH_ROUNDS);
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const unsubscribeToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
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const unsubscribeToken = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
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const consent = !!marketingConsent;
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const consent = !!marketingConsent;
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@@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ router.post('/reset-password', asyncRoute(async (req: Request, res: Response) =>
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'this account has been disabled' });
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return res.status(403).json({ error: 'this account has been disabled' });
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}
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}
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const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(String(password), 12);
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const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(String(password), PASSWORD_HASH_ROUNDS);
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const client = await pool.connect();
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const client = await pool.connect();
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try {
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try {
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@@ -475,7 +476,7 @@ router.post('/change-password', requireCustomer, asyncRoute(async (req: Request,
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if (!(await bcrypt.compare(currentPassword || '', customer.password_hash))) {
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if (!(await bcrypt.compare(currentPassword || '', customer.password_hash))) {
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'current password is incorrect' });
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return res.status(401).json({ error: 'current password is incorrect' });
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}
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}
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const newHash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, 12);
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const newHash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, PASSWORD_HASH_ROUNDS);
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await pool.query(`UPDATE customers SET password_hash = $1 WHERE id = $2`, [newHash, req.customerId]);
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await pool.query(`UPDATE customers SET password_hash = $1 WHERE id = $2`, [newHash, req.customerId]);
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// Password reset already ends every session, on the reasoning that a password
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// Password reset already ends every session, on the reasoning that a password
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
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import { hashRoundsFor, PRODUCTION_ROUNDS, TEST_ROUNDS } from '../../src/passwordHashing';
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// The cost factor is a security property, and the whole point of lowering it
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// under test is that it must not be lowered anywhere else. Asserted rather than
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// read, so a later edit that widens the test branch fails here first.
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describe('hashRoundsFor', () => {
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it('uses the cheap cost under test', () => {
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expect(hashRoundsFor('test')).toBe(TEST_ROUNDS);
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});
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it('uses the real cost in production', () => {
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expect(hashRoundsFor('production')).toBe(PRODUCTION_ROUNDS);
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});
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// The container sets NODE_ENV=production, but a bare `node dist/server.js`
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// does not set it at all. Absent must mean the strong cost, never the cheap
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// one — defaulting the other way is how a weak hash reaches real passwords.
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it('uses the real cost when NODE_ENV is unset', () => {
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expect(hashRoundsFor(undefined)).toBe(PRODUCTION_ROUNDS);
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});
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it('uses the real cost for any value that is not exactly "test"', () => {
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for (const value of ['development', 'staging', 'Test', 'TEST', 'testing', '']) {
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expect(hashRoundsFor(value)).toBe(PRODUCTION_ROUNDS);
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}
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});
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// Pinning the numbers themselves. Without this the tests above pass while
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// both constants drift to something useless.
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it('keeps the production cost at 12', () => {
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expect(PRODUCTION_ROUNDS).toBe(12);
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});
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it('keeps the test cost cheap enough to be worth doing', () => {
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expect(TEST_ROUNDS).toBeLessThanOrEqual(6);
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// bcrypt refuses a cost below 4.
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expect(TEST_ROUNDS).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(4);
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});
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});
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