diff --git a/backend/src/intake/actionLinks.ts b/backend/src/intake/actionLinks.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0546f64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/src/intake/actionLinks.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+import crypto from 'crypto';
+import { trimTrailingSlashes } from '../utils';
+
+/**
+ * Links in the notification email that act without a login.
+ *
+ * Only two actions are signable, and neither can publish. The worst case of a
+ * leaked link is a wasted API call or a hide the review queue can undo — which
+ * is what makes it acceptable to put them in an inbox at all.
+ *
+ * Signed over the item, the action and the expiry together. Signing any subset
+ * would let a link be replayed against a different item or upgraded to a
+ * different action, and leaving the expiry out of the payload would let anyone
+ * holding an expired link extend it by editing the timestamp in the URL.
+ */
+export type IntakeAction = 'regenerate' | 'discard';
+
+/** Thirty days. Long enough to survive a holiday, short enough to lapse. */
+export const ACTION_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+function secret(): string | null {
+  const value = process.env.INTAKE_ACTION_SECRET;
+  return value && value.trim() !== '' ? value : null;
+}
+
+export function signAction(itemId: number, action: IntakeAction, expiresAt: number): string {
+  const key = secret();
+  if (!key) throw new Error('INTAKE_ACTION_SECRET is not set');
+  return crypto
+    .createHmac('sha256', key)
+    .update(`${itemId}:${action}:${expiresAt}`)
+    .digest('base64url');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compared through a second digest rather than directly, because
+ * timingSafeEqual throws when the two buffers differ in length — and a
+ * malformed signature from a truncated link is an ordinary thing to receive
+ * rather than an exception. Same idiom as middleware/adminGate.ts.
+ */
+function digest(value: string): Buffer {
+  return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(value).digest();
+}
+
+export function verifyAction(
+  itemId: number,
+  action: IntakeAction,
+  expiresAt: number,
+  signature: string,
+  now: number = Date.now()
+): boolean {
+  if (!secret()) return false;
+  if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || now > expiresAt) return false;
+
+  const expected = signAction(itemId, action, expiresAt);
+  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(digest(expected), digest(signature));
+}
+
+/**
+ * The absolute link, or null when one cannot be made.
+ *
+ * Null rather than a throw or a relative path. An unconfigured environment
+ * still sends the notification with its review link — being told an item
+ * arrived matters far more than the shortcuts — and a link that could not be
+ * verified must never be offered in the first place.
+ */
+export function actionUrl(itemId: number, action: IntakeAction): string | null {
+  const base = process.env.PUBLIC_URL;
+  if (!secret() || !base || base.trim() === '') return null;
+
+  const expiresAt = Date.now() + ACTION_TTL_MS;
+  const sig = signAction(itemId, action, expiresAt);
+  const origin = trimTrailingSlashes(base);
+  return `${origin}/api/intake-actions/${itemId}/${action}?expires=${expiresAt}&sig=${sig}`;
+}
diff --git a/backend/tests/unit/actionLinks.test.ts b/backend/tests/unit/actionLinks.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6294f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/unit/actionLinks.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+import { signAction, verifyAction, actionUrl, ACTION_TTL_MS } from '../../src/intake/actionLinks';
+
+const SECRET = 'test-intake-secret';
+const NOW = 1_800_000_000_000;
+const EXPIRY = NOW + ACTION_TTL_MS;
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  process.env.INTAKE_ACTION_SECRET = SECRET;
+  process.env.PUBLIC_URL = 'https://shop.example.com';
+});
+
+describe('signAction / verifyAction', () => {
+  it('accepts a signature it produced', () => {
+    const sig = signAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY);
+    expect(verifyAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY, sig, NOW)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  // Each of these is a different link. A signature that survives any of these
+  // swaps is a signature that authorises more than it names.
+  it('refuses a signature reused for another item', () => {
+    const sig = signAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY);
+    expect(verifyAction(8, 'discard', EXPIRY, sig, NOW)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses a signature reused for another action', () => {
+    const sig = signAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY);
+    expect(verifyAction(7, 'regenerate', EXPIRY, sig, NOW)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  // Otherwise the expiry is decoration: anyone holding an expired link could
+  // extend it themselves by editing the timestamp.
+  it('refuses a signature whose expiry was altered', () => {
+    const sig = signAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY);
+    expect(verifyAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY + 1000, sig, NOW)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses an expired link even with a valid signature', () => {
+    const sig = signAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY);
+    expect(verifyAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY, sig, EXPIRY + 1)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses a malformed signature without throwing', () => {
+    expect(verifyAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY, 'not-a-signature', NOW)).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifyAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY, '', NOW)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  // This is what makes rotating the secret revoke every outstanding link.
+  it('refuses a signature made with a different secret', () => {
+    const sig = signAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY);
+    process.env.INTAKE_ACTION_SECRET = 'a-different-secret';
+    expect(verifyAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY, sig, NOW)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses everything when there is no secret at all', () => {
+    const sig = signAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY);
+    delete process.env.INTAKE_ACTION_SECRET;
+    expect(verifyAction(7, 'discard', EXPIRY, sig, NOW)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('actionUrl', () => {
+  it('builds an absolute url carrying the expiry and signature', () => {
+    const url = actionUrl(7, 'discard');
+    expect(url).toContain('https://shop.example.com/api/intake-actions/7/discard');
+    expect(url).toMatch(/expires=\d+/);
+    expect(url).toMatch(/sig=[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/);
+  });
+
+  // Absent secret is a working configuration: the notification still sends with
+  // its review link. A link that cannot be verified must never be offered.
+  it('returns null when there is no secret', () => {
+    delete process.env.INTAKE_ACTION_SECRET;
+    expect(actionUrl(7, 'discard')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('returns null when there is no public url to build against', () => {
+    delete process.env.PUBLIC_URL;
+    expect(actionUrl(7, 'discard')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('does not double the slash when PUBLIC_URL has a trailing one', () => {
+    process.env.PUBLIC_URL = 'https://shop.example.com/';
+    expect(actionUrl(7, 'discard')).toContain('https://shop.example.com/api/intake-actions/');
+  });
+});